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ABSTRACT
Standardization and harmonization efforts have reached a
consensus towards using a special-purpose Vehicular Public-
Key Infrastructure (VPKI) in upcoming Vehicular Commu-
nication (VC) systems. However, there are still several tech-
nical challenges with no conclusive answers; one such an
important yet open challenge is the acquisition of short-
term credentials, pseudonym: how should each vehicle inter-
act with the VPKI, e.g., how frequently and for how long?
Should each vehicle itself determine the pseudonym lifetime?
Answering these questions is far from trivial. Each choice
can affect both the user privacy and the system performance
and possibly, as a result, its security. In this paper, we make
a novel systematic effort to address this multifaceted ques-
tion. We craft three generally applicable policies and ex-
perimentally evaluate the VPKI system performance, lever-
aging two large-scale mobility datasets. We consider the
most promising, in terms of efficiency, pseudonym acquisi-
tion policies; we find that within this class of policies, the
most promising policy in terms of privacy protection can be
supported with moderate overhead. Moreover, in all cases,
this work is the first to provide tangible evidence that the
state-of-the-art VPKI can serve sizable areas or domain with
modest computing resources.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Communication (VC) systems aim at enhanc-
ing transportation safety and efficiency with a gamut of ap-
plications, ranging from collision avoidance to traffic con-
dition updates and Location Based Services [9, 18]. By
the same token, the need to enhance security and protect
user privacy is well understood [19]. Standardization bodies
(IEEE 1609.2 WG [13] and ETSI [9]) and harmonization ef-
forts (C2C-CC [6]) have reached a consensus to use public
key cryptography: a set of Certification Authorities (CAs)
constitute the Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI),
providing credentials to legitimate vehicles. Each vehicle,
equipped with an On-Board Unit (OBU), is provided with
a Long Term Certificate (LTC) (and has the corresponding
private key) to ensure accountable identification of the vehi-
cle. To achieve unlinkability of messages originating a vehi-
cle, a set of short-term certificates, termed pseudonyms, are
used with the corresponding short-term private keys. A ve-
hicle digitally signs an outgoing message, e.g., a Cooperative
Awareness Message (CAM) or a Decentralized Environmen-
tal Notification Message (DENM), time- and geo-stamped,
using the private key that corresponds to its currently valid
pseudonym. It then attaches the pseudonym to the signed
messages to facilitate validation by any recipient. Upon re-
ception, the pseudonym is verified (assuming a trust rela-
tionship with its issuer) before the message itself (signature
validation). This process ensures communication authen-
ticity, integrity and non-repudiation. By frequently chang-
ing the pseudonym (and the corresponding private key), the
sender privacy is also protected as the pseudonyms per se
are inherently unlinkable (if they are issued appropriately,
as it will become clear later).
Table 1 classifies different approaches for issuing pseudo-
nyms. A group of proposals suggests preloading the vehicles
with the required pseudonyms for a long period, which we
term as preloading schemes. Accordingly, systems relying on
preloading (C2C-CC [6], CAMP VSC3 [23], PRESERVE [2])
issue pseudonyms with overlapping lifetimes (validity inter-
vals) to facilitate the operation of the vehicles in safety crit-
ical situations. Recall that safety applications necessitate
partial linkability to operate because inferring a collision
hazard based on unlinkable CAMs can be hard and error
prone. However, having multiple simultaneously valid pseu-
donyms sets the ground for Sybil-based [8] misbehavior, i.e.,
allowing internal adversaries to inject multiple bogus mes-
sages, thus controlling the outcome of specific protocols, e.g.,
those based on voting [20]. To thwart this, SeVeCom [17]
and Safety Pilot [3] suggested preloading vehicles with pseu-
donyms that have non-overlapping lifetimes (no vehicle has
more than one valid pseudonym at any given time). An-
other group of proposals suggests more frequent vehicles in-
teractions with the Roadside Units (RSUs), i.e., with the
VPKI servers, e.g., once or multiple times per day, which
we term on-demand schemes. Among those, SRAAC [10],
V-tokens [21], and CoPRA [5] propose issuing pseudonyms
with overlapping lifetimes; while VeSPA [4], SEROSA [12],
SR-VPKI [14], and PUCA [11] propose issuing pseudonyms
with non-overlapping lifetimes.
Having different proposals with diverse views on pseudo-
nym acquisition process emphasizes the need to standardize
this process with clear objectives. Clearly, there are trade-
offs: the longer the interval to obtain pseudonyms, the less
frequent the vehicle-VPKI communications, but the higher
the probability (and the longer the duration) the pseudo-
nym provider can trivially link sets of pseudonyms issued
for the same vehicle and thus all communication signed by
Table 1: Comparing Pseudonym Refilling Strategies
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵
❵❵
Metrics
Strategies
Preloading & Overlapping Preloading & Nonoverlapping On-demand & Overlapping On-demand & Nonoverlapping
Storage size large large small small
Pseudonym quantity fixed & low volume fixed & high volume varying varying
Pseudonym lifetime long short varying varying
V-VPKI communication frequency low low high high
Communication overhead low low high high
Efficient pseudonym utilization very low very low high high
Pseudonym revocation difficult & challenging difficult & challenging no need (lower risk) no need (lower risk)
Pseudonym vulnerability window wide wide narrow narrow
Resilience to Sybil-based misbehavior × X × X
User privacy protection (probability of linking
sets of pseudonyms based on timing information)
privacy protection: high
(probability of linking: low)
privacy protection: low
(probability of linking: high)
privacy protection: high
(probability of linking: low)
privacy protection: low
(probability of linking: high)
User privacy protection (duration for which a pseudonym
provider can trivially link sets of pseudonyms for the
same vehicle; the longer the duration, the higher
the chance to link sets of pseudonyms)
privacy protection: low
(long duration)
privacy protection: low
(long duration)
privacy protection: high
(short duration)
privacy protection: high
(short duration)
Effect on safety application operations low low high high
Deployment cost (e.g. RSU) low low high high
Proposals & schemes
C2C-CC [6], PRESERVE [2],
CAMP VSC3 [23]
SeVeCom [17], Safety Pilot [3]
SRAAC [10], V-tokens [21],
CoPRA [5]
VeSPA [4], SEROSA [12],
SR-VPKI [14], PUCA [11]
that vehicle throughout that period. Furthermore, a pri-
vacy concern arises for any strategy that issues pseudonyms
with non-overlapping lifetimes [14]: the use of timing infor-
mation can enable an eavesdropper to link pseudonyms (the
transcript of pseudonymously authenticated messages) by
inspecting their successive pseudonym lifetimes. Addition-
ally, efficient pseudonym utilization is a challenging issue:
the average trip duration, according to available real mobil-
ity traces [7, 22], is around 10 minutes during week days.
According to the US Census Bureau annual American Com-
munity Survey [1, 23], the average daily commute time is
less than an hour. Thus, over-provisioning the vehicles with
a large number of unused pseudonyms would be a waste of
computation and resources.
Due to the (i) improved security, i.e., resilience to Sybil-
based misbehavior, (ii) user privacy protection, i.e., unlink-
able pseudonyms, and (iii) efficiency, i.e., no over-provisioni-
ng, on-demand pseudonym acquisition with non-overlapping
pseudonym lifetimes is preferable. Within this class of pro-
posals, we seek to address the fundamental questions: how
frequently, and for which period, each vehicle should inter-
act with the VPKI to obtain pseudonyms? Moreover, should
each vehicle have the freedom to determine the pseudonym
acquisition periods and the lifetime of the pseudonyms? We
further need to evaluate the effects of any approach on the
overall VPKI performance. The performance of the VPKI
relates to security and safety: if a pseudonym acquisition
approach and specific conditions result in excessive delays
to provision a vehicle, then either the vehicle would have to
sacrifice its privacy by using its LTC, or it would be excluded
from the system, exactly reducing safety and transportation
efficiency. This is why we need to investigate the overall
effect on the VPKI system.
Contributions: We make a novel systematic effort to
understand the pseudonym acquisition process. We propose
three generally applicable policies for pseudonym provision-
ing that capture alternative approaches in the literature.
To evaluate the overall VPKI performance, the fundamen-
tal metric is the end-to-end latency for the vehicle to obtain
pseudonyms. This is essentially the only bottleneck any ve-
hicle would encounter in an on-demand approach. We as-
sess the effect of the three policies on the performance of an
actual implementation of the most promising, in terms of
efficiency, VPKI; we leverage two large-scale mobility traces
(assuming all vehicles are equipped with VC enabling equip-
ments) to emulate realistic conditions.
In the rest of the paper, we give an overview of the system
and pseudonym acquisition policies (Sec. 2), followed by the
description of the protocols (Sec. 3). We evaluate the effects
of each policy on the overall VPKI performance (Sec. 4)
before concluding (Sec. 5).
2. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The common denominator among the majority of the pro-
posals and schemes (details in Table 1) in the literature is
essentially a VPKI architecture with two main entities: the
Long Term CA (LTCA) and the Pseudonym CA (PCA).
The LTCA is responsible for issuing LTCs for the registered
vehicles and is the policy decision and enforcement point :
it authenticates and authorizes the vehicles. The PCA is
the responsible authority for issuing the pseudonyms. In
case of misbehavior, detected locally [20] or for other rea-
sons [16], the Resolution Authority (RA) initiates a process
to resolve, and possibly revoke, a pseudonym based on a set
of pseudonymously authenticated messages. Without loss
of generality, we follow this common understanding without
dwelling on the details of each scheme. We adhere to the as-
sumed adversarial behavior [19]. We extend it by assuming
that the VPKI servers are honest-but-curious: they correctly
execute system protocols and follow the system policies, but
they are tempted to harm user privacy.
2.1 Pseudonym Acquisition Policies
The choice of policy for obtaining pseudonyms has diverse
ramifications: on the VPKI performance and operation as
well as the user privacy. The policy determines the volume
of the workload (basically, pseudonym requests and related
computation and communication latencies) imposed to the
VPKI. On the other hand, the user privacy is at stake: a
transcript of pseudonymously authenticated messages could
be linked simply based on the pseudonym lifetime and is-
suance times [14], and requests could act as user “finger-
prints”. Simply put, individually determined pseudonym
lifetimes allow an observer to link pseudonyms of the same
vehicle only based on timing information of the credentials
(without even examining the content of the message). To
systematically investigate the effect of diverse on-demand
non-overlapping pseudonym acquisition methods, we define
three representatives, summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of the Pseudonym Acquisition Policies
Notation Policy Name Limitations V-VPKI Interactions Privacy Preserving
P1 User-controlled (user-defined) Each user should know the exact trip duration. once per trip ×
P2 Oblivious Requesting for the last ΓP2, the user should obtain pseudonyms for the entire duration.
⌈
TripDuration
ΓP2
⌉
per trip ×
P3 Universally fixed
Each user cannot obtain all credentials with a single request.
Pseudonym lifetime should be a divisor/factor of the ΓP3.
Requesting for ΓiP3, each user should obtain pseudonyms for the entire Γ
i
P3.
⌈
TripDuration
ΓP3
⌉
per trip X
User-controlled (user-defined) policy (P1): A ve-
hicle requests pseudonyms for its residual (ideally entire)
trip duration at the start of trip. We presume each vehicle
precisely estimates the trip duration in advance, e.g., based
on automotive navigation systems, previous trips, or user
input. The PCA determines the pseudonym lifetime, either
fixed for all vehicles or flexible for each requester. Additional
pseudonyms should be requested if the actual trip duration
exceeds the estimated one to ensure that the vehicle is al-
ways equipped with enough valid pseudonyms.
Oblivious policy (P2): The vehicle interacts with the
VPKI every ΓP2 seconds (determined by the PCA and fixed
for all users) and it requests pseudonyms for the entire ΓP2
time interval until the vehicle reaches its destination. This
results in over-provisioning of pseudonyms only during the
last iteration.1 The difference, in comparison to P1, is that
either the vehicle does not know the exact trip duration, or,
it does not attempt to estimate, or possibly, overestimate it;
thus, P2 is oblivious to the trip duration.
Universally fixed policy (P3): The PCA has prede-
termined “universally” fixed interval, ΓP3, and pseudonym
lifetime, τP . At the start of its trip, a vehicle requests pseu-
donyms for the “current” ΓP3, out of which useful (non-
expired) ones are actually obtained for the residual trip du-
ration. For the remainder of the trip, the vehicle requests
pseudonyms for the entire ΓP3 at each time. This policy
issues time-aligned pseudonyms for all vehicles; thus, timing
information does not harm user privacy.
Fig. 1 illustrates the three pseudonym acquisition policies
with respect to trip duration, pseudonym lifetime (τP ), and
the PCA-determined periods (ΓP2 and ΓP3). Using P1 and
P2, the exact time of requests and all subsequent requests
until the end of trip could be unique, or one of few, and thus
linkable even by an external observer; it might be unlikely
in a specific region to have multiple requests at a specific in-
stance. While in contrast for P3, the requesting intervals fall
within the “universally” fixed interval (ΓP3) and the issued
pseudonyms are aligned with the global system time (PCA
clock); therefore, at any point in time all vehicles in a given
area will be transmitting under pseudonyms which are indis-
tinguishable, one from another, based on timing information
alone; thus, protecting user privacy.
3. PSEUDONYM ACQUISITION
For completeness and broader applicability, we extend and
refine the common system model (Sec. 2) to enable multi-
domain VPKI operation [14]. Our system works as follows:
each registered vehicle interacts first with its LTCA to ob-
tain a ticket. The LTCA authenticates and authorizes the
1As an optimization, a vehicle could roughly estimate the
residual trip duration, Dv; if Dv ≪ ΓP2, then it will request
only for the Dv period rather than the entire ΓP2 interval;
otherwise, it will request for the ΓP2 interval. Here for sim-
plicity, we do not consider this optimization.
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Figure 1: A Schematic Comparison of P1, P2, and P3
Table 3: Notation used in the protocols
P , P iv, (P
i
v)σPCA current valid pseudonym signed by the PCA
(LKv, Lkv) long-term public and private key pairs
(Kiv, k
i
v) current valid pseudonymous public and private key pairs
Idreq, Idres request/response identifiers
IdCA Certification Authority unique identifier
(msg)σv a signed message with the vehicle’s private key
N a nonce
tnow, ts, te, tdate current, starting, ending, and a specific day timestamps
SN serial number
Exptkt ticket expiration time
H() hash function
Sign(Lkca, msg) signing a message with private key (Lk) of the CA
V erify(LTCca,msg) verifying a message with the CA’s public key
τP pseudonym lifetime
ΓPx interacting period/interval with the VPKI for policy x
IK identifiable key
ζ a temporary variable
requester, issuing a service-granting ticket for the requester,
which enables the vehicle to obtain pseudonyms from any
PCA. The trust establishment between the LTCA and the
PCA is with the help of a higher-level authority or by using
cross certification [15]. The vehicle, i.e., the OBU2, decides
when to trigger the pseudonym acquisition process based
on different parameters, e.g., the number of remaining valid
pseudonyms, the residual trip duration, and the networking
connectivity. We presume connectivity to the VPKI (via
RSUs, cellular networks, or other connectivities) to execute
all of these protocols. Should the connectivity be intermit-
tent, the OBU could initiate the protocols proactively when
there is connectivity. Further discussion on a reliable con-
nectivity to the VPKI is beyond the scope of this paper.
The notation used in the protocols is given in Table 3.
Ticket Acquisition Process (Protocols 1 and 2):
Assume the OBU decides to obtain pseudonyms from a spe-
2The terms vehicle and OBU are used interchangeably.
Protocol 1 Ticket Request (from the LTCA)
1: procedure ReqTicket(Px,ΓPx, ts, te, tdate)
2: if Px = P1 then
3: (ts, te)← (ts, te)
4: else if Px = P2 then
5: (ts, te)← (ts, ts + ΓP2)
6: else if Px = P3 then
7: (ts, te)← (tdate + Γ
i
P3), tdate + Γ
i+1
P3 )
8: end if
9: ζ ← (Idtkt-req,H(IdPCA‖Rndtkt), ts, te)
10: (ζ)σv ← Sign(Lkv , ζ)
11: return ((ζ)σv ,LTCv, N, tnow)
12: end procedure
Protocol 2 Issuing a Ticket (by the LTCA)
1: procedure IssueTicket((msg)σv ,LTCv, N, tnow)
2: Verify(LTCv, (msg)σv)
3: IKtkt ← H(LTCv||ts||te||RndIKtkt )
4: ζ ← (SN,H(IdPCA‖Rndtkt), IKtkt, ts, te, Exptkt)
5: (tkt)σltca ← Sign(Lkltca, ζ)
6: return ((tkt)σltca , RndIKtkt , N + 1, tnow)
7: end procedure
cific PCA. If the relevant policy is P1, each vehicle estimates
the actual trip duration [ts, te] (steps 1.2–1.3, i.e., steps 2–3
in protocol 1) while with P2, each vehicle requests pseudo-
nyms for [ts, ts+ΓP2] (steps 1.4–1.5). If the relevant policy is
P3, the vehicle calculates the trip duration based on the date
of travel, tdate, and the exact time of travel corresponding
to the universally fixed interval, ΓP3, of that specific PCA
(steps 1.6–1.7). It then calculates the hash value of the con-
catenation of the specific PCA identity with a random num-
ber; this conceals the identity of the PCA from the LTCA.
The vehicle prepares the request (step 1.9) before signing it
using the private key corresponding to its LTC (step 1.10),
and returning the ticket request (step 1.11). It will then
interact with the LTCA over a bidirectional authenticated
Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Upon reception of the ticket request, the LTCA verifies
the LTC (thus authenticating and authorizing the requester)
and the signed message (step 2.2). The LTCA calculates
the “ticket identifiable key” to bind the ticket to the LTC as:
H(LTCv||ts||te||RndIKtkt ) (step 2.3); this prevents a com-
promised LTCA from mapping a different LTC during the
resolution process. The LTCA then encapsulates (step 2.4),
signs (step 2.5), and delivers the response (step 2.6).
Pseudonym Acquisition Process (Protocols 3 and
4): Upon reception of a valid ticket, the vehicle generates re-
quired Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
public/private key pairs (steps 3.2–3.6). It then prepares the
request (step 3.7) and sends the pseudonym request to the
PCA over a unidirectional authenticated TLS.
Having received a request, the PCA verifies the ticket,
signed by the LTCA (assuming a trust is established) (steps
4.2–4.3). The PCA then verifies the pseudonym provider
identity (step 4.4) and the requesting intervals for obtain-
ing pseudonyms (step 4.5). Afterward, the PCA initiates a
proof-of-possession protocol to verify the ownership of the
corresponding private keys. Then, it calculates the “pseudo-
nym identifiable key” to bind the pseudonyms to the ticket
Protocol 3 Pseudonym Request (from the PCA)
1: procedure ReqPsnyms(ts, te, (tkt)σltca)
2: for i:=1 to n do
3: Begin
4: Generate(Kiv, k
i
v)
5: (Kiv)σkiv
← Sign(kiv,K
i
v)
6: End
7: psnymReq← (Idreq, Rndtkt, ts, te, (tkt)σltca ,
{(K1v)σk1v
, ..., (Knv )σknv
}, N, tnow)
8: return psnymReq
9: end procedure
Protocol 4 Issuing Pseudonyms (by the PCA)
1: procedure IssuePsnyms(psnymReq)
2: psnymReq→ (Idreq, Rndtkt, ts, te, (tkt)σltca ,
{(K1v )σk1v
, ..., (Knv )σknv
}, N, tnow)
3: Verify(LTCltca, (tkt)σltca)
4: H(Idthis-PCA‖Rndtkt)
?
= H(IdPCA‖Rndtkt)
5: [ts, te]
?
= ([ts, te])tkt
6: for i:=1 to n do
7: Begin
8: Verify(Kiv, (K
i
v)σkiv
)
9: IKP i ← H(IKtkt||K
i
v||t
i
s||t
i
e||RndIKiv )
10: ζ ← (SN i,Kiv, IKP i , t
i
s, t
i
e)
11: (P iv)σpca ← Sign(Lkpca, ζ)
12: End
13: return ({(P 1v )σpca , . . . , (P
n
v )σpca},
{RndIK1v , . . . , RndIK
n
v
}, N+1, tnow)
14: end procedure
as: H(IKtkt||K
i
v ||t
i
s||t
i
e||RndIKiv ). This essentially prevents
a compromised PCA from mapping a different ticket during
resolution process. It issues the pseudonyms (steps 4.6–4.12)
and delivers the response (step 4.13).
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Due to the lack of a large-scale deployment of VC sys-
tems, we resort to realistic large-scale mobility traces, which
determine the period the vehicles need pseudonyms. We ex-
tract two features of interest from the mobility traces, i.e.,
departure time and trip duration, and we apply policies de-
scribed in Sec. 2.1 to assess the efficiency of the full-blown
implementation of our VPKI for a large-scale deployment.
The main metric is the end-to-end pseudonym acquisition
latency, i.e., the delay from the initialization of protocol 1
till the successful completion of protocol 4 (steps 1.1–4.14),
measured at the vehicle. The processing time to generate
the key pairs (steps 3.2–3.6) is not considered here as the
OBU can generate them off-line.
4.1 Experimental Setup
VPKI Testbed: We create a testbed comprising dif-
ferent Virtual Machines (VMs) allocated to distinct VPKI
servers; Table 4 details the specifications for the servers and
the emulated client3. Our implementation is in C++ and we
3The processing power of the client is comparable to
the Nexcom boxes (dual-core 1.66GHz, 2GB memory) in
PRESERVE project [2] as we execute all clients in one VM.
Table 4: Servers and Clients Specifications
LTCA PCA RA Client
Number of entities 1 1 1 1
Dual-core CPU (Ghz) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
BogoMips 4000 4000 4000 4000
Memory 2GB 2GB 1GB 1GB
Database MySQL MySQL MySQL MySQL
Table 5: Mobility Traces Information
TAPASCologne LuST
Number of vehicles 75,576 138,259
Number of trips 75,576 287,939
Duration of snapshot (hour) 24 24
Available duration of snapshot (hour) 2 (6-8 AM) 24
Average trip duration (sec.) 590.49 692.81
use OpenSSL for the cryptographic protocols and primitives,
i.e., TLS and ECDSA-256 (according to the standards [9,
13]). We run the experiments in our testbed with VPKI
servers and clients (emulating OBUs) running on the VMs.
This set up eliminates the network propagation delays of
OBU-VPKI connectivity. Depending on the actual OBU-
VPKI connectivity, the network propagation delays would
vary; for simplicity, we do not consider it here.
Mobility Traces: To have realistic arriving requests to
the VPKI, we used two microscopic mobility vehicle datasets:
TAPASCologne [22] and Luxembourg SUMO Traffic (LuST)
[7], detailed in Table 5. The former one represents the traffic
demand information across the Ko¨ln urban area (available
for 2 hours, 6-8 AM) while the latter presents a full-day
realistic mobility pattern in the city of Luxembourg.
4.2 VPKI Servers Performance
Figs. 2-4 show the interplay between the end-to-end la-
tency, averaged over all completed protocol executions within
each minute period, and different pseudonym acquisition
policies (with different configurations) for the two datasets.
Table 6 details end-to-end latency statistics for each policy.
With P1 (Fig. 2), each vehicle requests all required pseudo-
nyms at once; with τP = 0.5 min., 99% of the requesters for
TAPASCologne and LuST datasets are served within less
than 153 ms and 167 ms respectively. As it is shown in Fig.
2.b, the end-to-end latency with P1 follows the arrival dis-
tribution and it is fluctuating over time; the reason is that
with P1, vehicles can request for any trip duration, thus
requesting more pseudonyms at once.
With P2 (Fig. 3), the vehicles request a fixed amount
of pseudonyms every time (for a duration of ΓP2=5 min.),
thus never overloading the PCA server with large amount of
pseudonyms acquisition in a single request; this results in a
low standard deviation and variance, and a smooth end-to-
end latency in compare with other policies. The end-to-end
latency for the TAPAS and LuST datasets (τP=0.5 min.) is
50 ms and 45 ms respectively; accordingly, 99% of vehicles
are served within less than 109 ms and 80 ms respectively.
With P3 (Fig. 4), the system enforces synchronized batch
arrivals to obtain pseudonyms: each vehicle requests pseu-
donyms for the entire ΓP3, timely aligned with the rest. The
end-to-end latency for the two datasets (τP=0.5 min.) is 45
ms and 47 ms respectively; moreover, 99% of the requesters
are served within less than 70 ms and 74 ms respectively.
The results confirm that our secure and privacy preserv-
ing scheme efficiently issues pseudonyms for the requesters;
Table 6: Latency Statistics for each Policy
(Γ = 5 min., τP = 0.5 min.)
TAPAS-P1 TAPAS-P2 TAPAS-P3 LuST-P1 LuST-P2 LuST-P3
Maximum (ms) 426 268 4254 504 248 3408
Minimum (ms) 17 26 18 15 25 20
Average (ms) 69 50 45 69 45 47
Std. Deviation 26 17 23 30 12 21
Variance 708 295 535 895 138 449
Pr{t ≤ x} = 0.99 (ms) 153 109 70 167 80 74
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Figure 2: End-to-end latency for P1
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Figure 3: End-to-end latency for P2, ΓP2=5 minutes
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Figure 4: End-to-end latency for P3, ΓP3=5 minutes
thus, an OBU can initiate a request for pseudonyms within
the lifetime of the last single valid pseudonym. We can con-
clude that modest VMs can serve very large number of vehi-
cles even during the most harsh traffic conditions with very
low delays, and the most promising policy in terms of pri-
vacy protection incurs moderate overhead. The choice of
parameters for ΓP2/P3 and τP mainly determines the fre-
quency of interaction with the VPKI and the volume of
workload imposed to the PCA: the shorter the pseudonym
lifetimes are, the greater number of pseudonyms will be re-
quested, thus a higher workload is imposed on the PCA.
As the results show, issuing pseudonyms with very short
lifetimes (30 sec.) does not have a high impact on the over-
all performance of the servers. The results presented here
are obviously dataset-dependent; however, by understanding
the characteristics of the mobility, i.e., the road-constrained
movements, the appearance of the RSUs, vehicle movement
direction, and sudden bursts of traffic, system designers can
evaluate the impact of a given mobility trace on the deploy-
ment and dimensioning of the VPKI resources.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Remark on the suitability of non-overlapping pseu-
donym lifetimes for safety applications: As mentioned
earlier, safety applications can operate more easily if there
is linkability (with the vehicle keeping the same pseudonym)
during a critical situation. In such a case, e.g., emergency
braking or collision avoidance, the vehicle can simply in-
clude a link to its previous pseudonym. In fact, the vehicle
could even sign with two ki−1v and k
i
v private keys, corre-
sponding to pseudonyms P i−1v and P
i
v. This would ensure
the operation of the safety application (partial linkability).
Summary and future work: In this paper, we speci-
fied three policies for pseudonym acquisition, drawing from
the literature. We integrated those into the pseudonym ac-
quisition process of the state-of-the-art VPKI system [14].
To the best of our knowledge, our system [14] is the latest
and fastest VPKI. Nonetheless, our investigation is rele-
vant to any VPKI that relies on non-overlapping on-demand
pseudonyms acquisition. We presented a secure and efficient
solution for pseudonyms acquisition while the timing infor-
mation cannot harm user privacy. Through experimental
evaluation, we demonstrated that modest VMs dedicated as
servers can serve on-demand requests with very low delay,
and the most promising policy in terms of privacy protection
incurs moderate overhead.
Using P1, a vehicle interacts with the VPKI servers once
to obtain the necessary pseudonyms for the entire trip dura-
tion (ideally without over-provisioning). However, accord-
ing to P2 and P3, vehicles could be potentially equipped
with more pseudonyms than needed, i.e., the PCA might
issue pseudonyms for a period during which the vehicle will
not use them. In general, the longer the pseudonym refill
interval (ΓP2 or ΓP3) is, the less frequent vehicles-VPKI
interactions, but the higher the chance to overprovision a
vehicle. As future work, we will investigate the pseudonym
utilization with various configurations (ΓP2/P3 and τP ) to
investigate the interplay with the server workload and pri-
vacy protection (the shorter τP , the less linkable are mes-
sages by a vehicle). We further intend to rigorously analyze
the security and privacy protocols and evaluate the level of
privacy, i.e., unlinkability, based on the timing information
of the pseudonyms for each policy.
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